We use variation in corruption convictions across judicial districts in the US to examine the relationship between political corruption and risk-taking of public firms. Firms headquartered in regions with high levels of political corruption have lower total risk and lower idiosyncratic risk on average. Further analysis shows that corruption tends to encourage firms to pursue risk-decreasing investments, lower the riskiness of their operations, and decrease asset liquidity. While managerial ownership is intended to align the interests of managers and shareholders, the (...) presence of corruption appears to encourage undiversified managers to decrease risk-taking. Our evidence is consistent with agency theory and the asset-shielding argument that political corruption discourages managers from taking risks that expose firms to expropriation by politicians, resulting in suboptimal corporate policies. (shrink)

Historians typically tell stories about the past, but how are we to understand the epistemic status of those narratives? This problem is particularly pressing for history education, which seeks guidance not only on the question of which narrative to teach but also more fundamentally on the question of the goals of instruction in history. This article explores the nature of historical narrative, first, by engaging with the seminal work of Hayden White, and second, by developing the critique of White by (...) David Carr. The picture of historical inquiry that emerges is one in which the fundamental cognitive activity is one of negotiating among narratives. Students, like historians, like any of us, come to the work of historical inquiry in possession of prior narratives, which are then thrown into an encounter with other narratives of varying size and scope. Good historians enact the negotiation among narratives responsibly and well, demonstrating the virtues of historical interpretation. History education, therefore, ought to help students improve their historical interpretations at the same time as it fosters those qualities that make them good interpreters. (shrink)

No articulation of `historical thinking' has been as influential as Sam Wineburg's position, according to which historical thinking is, fundamentally, the recognition of the ways in which the past is different than the present. Wineburg argues, further, that achieving that state is `unnatural.' This paper critiques both of these claims, arguing instead that we should replace a generic conception of historical thinking with one that is much more rooted in the specific practice of the discipline. It is surely necessary for (...) students to learn this practice, but it is not unnatural. Instead, learning to think historically is learning to speak the language of the discipline that we call ‘history.’. (shrink)

Scholars find that political elites are badly polarized over a large range of policy issues, but they tend to agree that the mass public is much more ambivalent. The abortion war in particular is regarded as one in which millions of ambivalent citizens are caught in the crossfire of polarized activists. Yet even abortion activists struggle to escape the very ambivalent sentiments that plague ordinary Americans. These common sentiments even exert a moderating influence on both movements in ways that are (...) consistent with the preferences of the American public. They also suggest that liberalism may be mired in permanent conflict and ambivalence over the scope of basic human rights. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The media's attentive vigil over America's most militant and outrageous activists in the abortion wars has obscured a massive but quiet effort on the part of evangelicals to engage their opponents in exemplary deliberative discussions about bioethics. For a variety of reasons, activists in the pro‐life movement are more committed to carving out civic spaces for such dialogue than are their pro‐choice counterparts. This discrepancy invites investigation into the forces that promote and constrain political movements' interest in deliberation, as (...) well as highlighting the undeniable limits to deliberative ideals. (shrink)

MORE THAN MOST PHILOSOPHERS, Spinoza needed a coherent and sophisticated set of views on the nature of possibility: many of his most important philosophical positions and arguments depended on it. As one example, take Ethics IP33. This Proposition—among the most famous of the Ethics— states, “Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order than they have been produced.” In a salutary attempt to clarify the meaning of IP33 et relata, Spinoza adds in (...) the first Scholium to IP33 that “by these propositions I have shown more clearly than the noon light that there is absolutely nothing in things on account of which they can be called contingent.” Now, such assertions were bound to give rise to numerous objections and Spinoza knew it. To meet these objections, he immediately proceeds to one of the most powerful: namely, are there not things that actually have been “produced by God” that need not have been “produced by God?” And would it not make sense to call these things “contingent or possible?” In reply, Spinoza reinterprets the concept of possibility. We call existing things “contingent” “only because of a defect of our knowledge.” There are, he continues, two types of deficiency that lead us to regard existing things as “contingent or possible”: either we do not know “that the thing’s essence involves a contradiction” or we do know that the thing’s essence does not involve a contradiction but we do not know enough about the “order of causes” to affirm anything “certainly about its existence.”. (shrink)

Abstract Scholars find that political elites are badly polarized over a large range of policy issues, but they tend to agree that the mass public is much more ambivalent. The abortion war in particular is regarded as one in which millions of ambivalent citizens are caught in the crossfire of polarized activists. Yet even abortion activists struggle to escape the very ambivalent sentiments that plague ordinary Americans. These common sentiments even exert a moderating influence on both movements in ways that (...) are consistent with the preferences of the American public. They also suggest that liberalism may be mired in permanent conflict and ambivalence over the scope of basic human rights. (shrink)

Social roles theorists claim that differences between the sexes are of limited consequence. Such misperceptions lead to misunderstanding the important role of sexual selection in explaining phenotypic differences both between species and within humans. Countering these claims, we explain how sexual dimorphism in humans affect expressions of artistic display and patterns of male and female aggression across the ovulatory cycle.

Nearly all research in neurofeedback since the 1960s has focused on training voluntary control over EEG constructs. By contrast, EEG state discrimination training focuses on awareness of subjective correlates of EEG states. This study presents the first successful replication of EEG alpha state discrimination first reported by Kamiya . A 150-s baseline was recorded in 106 participants. During the task, low triggered a prompt. Participants indicated “high” or “low” with a keypress response and received immediate feedback. Seventy-five percent of participants (...) achieved significant discrimination within nine sessions, with a significant learning curve effect. Performance was significantly related to physical properties of the EEG signal, including magnitude, duration, and absolute vs. relative amplitude. These results are consistent with a conceptualization of EEG state discrimination as a sensory modality, although it is also intricately related to voluntary control of these states. (shrink)

This paper takes up and provides three answers to the question “Why study philosophy?” Beginning with a discussion of why this question has been ignored in literature pertaining to the teaching of philosophy, the paper turns to an analysis of what it means to ask about the importance of philosophy, pointing out that the question is ambiguous with other questions like “why should so-and-so study philosophy” or “why does so-and-so study philosophy.” The author then provides three answers that are similar (...) to those provided by Hume: one should study philosophy because it may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. The paper argues for the superiority of these answers over traditional responses and points to the importance of this question in teaching philosophy. (shrink)

Talisse and Maloney seem to think that professors, not ordinary citizens, are the key to a more deliberative democracy. Yet these professors fail to appreciate the reasonableness of the pro‐life activists and thinkers they disagree with. For example, they falsely charge even the most deliberative groups with resurrecting an obsolete debate and framing conversations in a fallacious way. They further place an unreasonable justificatory burden on pro‐life activists and hold them culpable for framing the debate around the ontology of the (...) embryo . In drawing such a hard line between academics and activists, they also miss what has been an unavoidable partnership between academics and social movements in our imperfect deliberative republic. (shrink)

Critics of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) have repeatedly argued that there is no proof for the condition being symptomatic of an organic brain disease and that the current "ADHD epidemic" is an expression of medicalization. To this, the supporters of ADHD can retort that the condition is only defined as a mental disorder and not a physical disease. As such, ADHD needs only be a harmful mental dysfunction, which, like other genuine disorders, can have a complex and obscure etiology. This article (...) argues that such a line of argument fails to save ADHD as a valid diagnostic category. Given the general diagnostic logic of the DSM-IV and how ADHD has been defined in terms of everyday (male) child behaviors, there are compelling grounds to disbelieve that ADHD can be a true medical syndrome united by some type of harmful dysfunction. Indeed, strong logical and empirical reasons will be adduced to show that people may qualify for ADHD diagnosis without suffering from any type of underlying pathology. (shrink)

According to the ‘fact-plus-value’ model of pathology propounded by K. W. M. Fulford, ‘disease’ is a value term that ought to reflect a ‘balance of values’ stemming from patients and doctors and other ‘stakeholders’ in medical nosology. In the present article I take issue with his linguistic-analytical arguments for why pathological status must be relative to such a kind of medico-ethical normativity. Fulford is right to point out that Boorse and other naturalists are compelled to utilize evaluative terminology when they (...) characterize the nature of diseases and biological dysfunctions. But the relevant ‘biofunctional judgements’ are no less factual and empirical for that. While it is indeed evaluative to say that biological dysfunctions involve failures to execute naturally selected functions, such judgments are not bound to entail anything about what is good or bad for us, and what should be treated or not. In the last part of the paper I ruminate briefly on the relationship between ‘biological evaluationism’, on my construal, and descriptions of ‘causal biology’. As I note in my conclusion, a strict bioevaluative concept of disease can be valid for every species on earth, and thus be of particular usefulness in general biological contexts. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Donald Trump’s victory depended on the defection of hundreds of longstanding Democratic communities. Trump appealed to these communities partly because he behaves like some of their most beloved politicians. Like the president, these politicians are brazen, thin skinned, nepotistic, and offer an older, boss-centered vision of politics. Trump—the anti-establishment outsider—appealed to voters in these communities because he resembles the local insiders. This appeal widens an old fault line inside the Democratic Party.

Del Giudice addresses a complex and pertinent theoretical issue: the evolutionary adaptiveness of sex differences in attachment styles in relation to life history strategy. Although we applaud Del Giudice for calling attention to the problem, we regret that he does not sufficiently specify how attachment styles serve as an integral part of a coordinate life history strategy for either sex.

Although their work in the philosophy of biology is not well known, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Ruyer all offer interesting and heterodox accounts of the life and environmental sciences and the organism in particular. In this chapter, we discuss their respective views, with a focus on their shared criticisms of Neo- Darwinism and the way this tradition grasped the structural coupling between organism and environment. We also outline some significant differences between each of them concerning how to conceive of that holistic (...) relation and the extent of “captivation” of the animal to its environment. Given that there are indications that the twenty-first century might be post-genomic/epigenetic, we argue that it is worth revisiting these neglected organicist trajectories that sought to navigate between mechanism and vitalism. (shrink)

Evidential Pluralism maintains that in order to establish a causal claim one normally needs to establish the existence of an appropriate conditional correlation and the existence of an appropriate mechanism complex, so when assessing a causal claim one ought to consider both association studies and mechanistic studies. Hitherto, Evidential Pluralism has been applied to medicine, leading to the EBM+ programme, which recommends that evidence-based medicine should systematically evaluate mechanistic studies alongside clinical studies. This paper argues that Evidential Pluralism can also (...) be fruitfully applied to the social sciences. In particular, Evidential Pluralism provides (i) a new approach to evidence-based policy; (ii) an account of the evidential relationships in more theoretical research; and (iii) new philosophical motivation for mixed methods research. The application of Evidential Pluralism to the social sciences is also defended against two objections. (shrink)

Through case studies in sociology, economics and legal studies, this book advances new philosophical foundations for the methods of the social sciences, providing an account of how to establish or evaluate causal claims, and offering a new way of thinking about evidence-based policy, basic social science research and mixed methods research.

The publication of Political Liberalismhas allowed John Rawls to bring to the fore issues that remained in the background of A Theory of Justice. His explicit attention to the concept of ‘the reasonable’ is a welcome development. In a more recent publication, he affirms the importance of this concept, ‘while [granting] that the idea of the reasonable needs a more thorough examination than Political Liberalism offers.’ In this paper, I will present a critical exposition of the senses of the reasonable (...) on which justice as fairness relies. Rawls employs the term in four main contexts. I will outline these various senses and argue that in each case, a controversy in the secondary literature can be resolved by close attention to the concept of the reasonable. In three of these contexts, Rawls relies on what I will call a ‘strong’ sense of the reasonable, while in one he sometimes seems to rely on a ‘weak’ sense. I argue that justice as fairness is best served by relying on a strong sense throughout. (shrink)

Rousseauian Constructivism JON MANDLE ROUSSEAU'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY focusses on the idea of the general will. Unfortunately, it often seems as though this central idea raises more questions than it answers. This paper will develop an interpretation of Rousseau's politi- cal philosophy that starts from an understanding of the general will. I do not claim that this reading solves all of the paradoxical and difficult aspects of Rousseau's moral and political thought. For example, I do not discuss his ac- count of (...) freedom or his theory of moral education. However, I believe that it is necessary to understand Rousseau's notion of the general will properly before addressing these other topics. As Judith Shklar writes: "The general will is Rousseau's most successful metaphor. It conveys everything he most wanted to say."' Patrick Riley has demonstrated that the notion of a general will has its origins in theological disputes. But, as Riley also notes, there are a number of possible approaches to Rousseau, "each one laden with real fruit. One can approach Rousseau as the high point of the social contract tradition. ''~ In this paper, I present an account of the general will which at- tempts to identify more clearly Rousseau's position in this social contract tradi- tion, especially through a contrast with Hobbes. As I demonstrate in the con- cluding section, a proper understanding of the general will reveals important connections to.. (shrink)

Rawls defended the model of a property‐owning democracy; critically reflected on the US constitutional history of free speech; and argued that “both Hiroshima and the fire‐bombing of Japanese cities were great evils.” What ties these and many other disparate concerns together is the idea of the original position. “Justice as Fairness,” published in 1958, included several crucial developments. Rawls proposes his “two principles of justice,” which, through various revisions, he would defend for the rest of his career: a principle of (...) equal liberty and a principle encompassing fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. Rawls argues that parties would accept his two principles in two stages: first, by a comparison with average utilitarianism, which focuses on his first principle, and then by a comparison with so‐called “mixed conceptions,” which focuses on the second principle. Rawls continues to claim that the original position establishes a form of objectivity. (shrink)

The existence of “local implicatures” has been the topic of much recent debate. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this debate by asking what we can learn from three puzzles, namely, the cancellation of such implicatures by or both, their behavior in the complement clauses of negative factive verbs such as sorry, and their behavior in root and embedded questions. Two basic approaches to local implicatures have been advanced: a fully pragmatic account in which local implicatures result (...) from conventional Gricean principles and a semantic account according to which the generation of implicatures is interwoven with compositional, grammatical mechanisms. We argue that the lesson to be learned from our three case studies is that some kind of approach along the latter, grammatical line is necessary to account for the data. (shrink)

The work of John Rawls is central to contemporary political philosophy. A Theory of Justice provides a model for the justification of substantive principles of justice, and it defends principles that reject utilitarianism. Ultimately, justification is a matter of what the participants in a relationship or an institution can justify to one another. Unlike utilitarianism, which assumes that there is one good that it is the job of morality to maximize, Rawls holds that there are multiple conceptions of the good (...) associated with different individuals. Furthermore, he holds that there are multiple principles of morality associated with different relationships and institutions. His principles of justice are designed for one of these—the basic structure of society. They establish a moral minimum that all members of a society owe to one another, but additional principles are required to govern other special relationships. (shrink)

The “straw man” prior expectation of the dominant social psychology paradigm is that humans should behave with perfect rationality and high ethical standards. The more modest claim of evolutionary psychologists is that humans have evolved specific adaptations for adaptive problems that were reliably present in the ancestral environment. Outside that restricted range of problems, one should not expect optimal behavior.

This article discusses whether a child can and should be engaged as a co-researcher on moral and epistemological grounds. Selected research literature has been used to illustrate various approaches to the issue of children's participating as co-researchers in social research. By exploring the predicament of childhood and the meaning of the concept ‘research’, we attempt to clarify the necessary conditions for a person to qualify as a researcher and for an activity to qualify as research. We then look at the (...) extent to which the concept of ‘child’ fits within these frames. (shrink)

Before we respond to Tamara Browne's proposal for an external ethics advisory review panel to oversee content in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, we wish to introduce ourselves. One of us is a professor of bioethics, a lawyer, and a doctor of public policy, and one of us is a philosopher of psychiatry who studies psychiatric nosology, and who has done bioethics work for two congressional advisory agencies. Based on our backgrounds, we flatter ourselves that we might (...) be considered as members of the DSM ethical review panel Browne proposes. However, we realize that one of us would likely be ineligible because of a lack of experience in psychiatry, and the other would... (shrink)